Friday, 8 September 2017

Trump's America: The Power of Groupthink (my notes on a Special Report from The Economist)

I felt like this was a phenomenally illuminating Special Report from The Economist. Here are my notes on it. It explains that people aren’t that swayed by policy, but by the person they most like or trust. Trump, by sticking up for issues his voters care about, has won their trust. And he now has the latitude to pick the policies he wants, confident that his supporters will go along with them.
Why do people support candidates in general?
Not by weighing up each of the candidates’ policies in turn: most voters pay little attention to politics.
  • Only a fifth of Americans pay ‘close attention’ to politics.
  • At the other end of things, a fifth of voters weren’t sure whether Trump or Clinton was the more conservative.
Instead, voters adapt their preferences to fit the candidate or party they like. Their political attitudes are not fixed.
  • About half of anti-abortion men who voted Democrat in 1982 had become pro-choice 15 years later.
  • In 2011, white evangelicals were the most likely group to say that personal morality was important in a president; now they are the least likely.
That said, voters are more likely to like candidates who come up with certain policies.
  • People favour tax cuts and also increased government spending. Trump promised both.
  • Many voters have also been attracted by Trump’s nativism, seen in his railings against trade (which voters care about a little) and immigration (which they care about a lot).
But generally, people tend to vote for, and vote with, people like them—people they can trust. And they tend to do this very consistently.
  • 90% of those who supported Obama in 2012 supported Hillary.
  • 90% of those who supported Romney in 2012 supported Trump.
Communal groupthink is a powerful force here. People tend to adopt the attitudes of the groups they cluster in. Communities around are becoming more homogenous, more partisan.
  • In 1992, 39% lived in districts where a presidential candidate won more than 60% of the vote. The figure was 61% by 2006. It’s not that Republicans and Democrats are moving to be near their own kind; rather, they’re becoming like those who’re already nearby.
So why did people support Trump?
They felt like could trust him. For the first time in many years, they felt had a candidate who recognised them. Trump voters feel that life is unfair. They feel they’ve been ignored by elite politicians. They feel that recent arrivals in America are ‘queue-jumping’. They’re worried about getting left behind economically. Trump has spoken up for them on all these issues.
This feeling of unfairness and victimisation is exacerbated by partisanship, which is increasingly a social virtue.
  • A quarter of conservatives and liberals would be unhappy if their children married someone from the other side.
  • Many Republicans feel oppressed by ‘liberal feeling rules’, attitudes to minorities, gay people and women that they do not share.
This general lack of trust makes many Republicans blame Democrat elites for their problems. Many of the losses to manufacturing, mining etc. have been because of increased mechanisation, competition from elsewhere in the country or from abroad, etc. But Republicans can interpret the losses as a deliberate choice made by the powerful and uncaring.
Trust in Trump and antipathy towards others are also heightened by issues of race. Few Americans—Trump supporters included—are racist. But they do unconsciously sympathise more with those of their own racial group, and want someone to speak up on their behalf.
  • Over 40% of Trump voters think it’s ‘very’ or ‘extremely important’ that whites work together to change laws that are unfair to whites. Just under 20% of Hillary voters thought the same too.
  • Half of Trump voters thought Obama was Muslim.
Then there’s economic insecurity. Now, Trump’s popularity is supposed to be the result of economic distress. But the economy’s recovered from 2008. Unemployment is low and the S&P’s setting new records. So what role is economic insecurity playing?
Seymour Lipset theorised that in times of prosperity, some groups become anxious about being eclipsed by others. Unfortunately, there’s not much the government can do to alleviate such status anxiety and conflict, so it persists. Minority ethnic and religious groups often become convenient scapegoats.
Why aren’t they turned off by Trump’s wealth? Or by his promised tax-cuts for the rich? Most Trump voters admire wealthy people, Trump included. The white working class don’t dream of becoming upper-middle class, with its funny food and family patterns. They want to live in their own class milieu—but as their own boss and with more money. Like Trump.
On all these issues—partisanship, race, insecurity—Trump has said exactly what his supporters feel. He attacks Democratic elites, sticks up for whites, and expresses his supporters’ status anxiety in his attacks minorities. For that, he has his voters’ trust. And he may well have it into the next election.
Why might voters continue to support him, despite his blundering presidency?
The president therefore has a great deal of latitude with his voters, both with getting them to support his policies, and with getting them to overlook his faults.
As we saw earlier, his supporters aren’t not sure what they want from him policy-wise. They just know that Trump sides with them. So when they consider a policy choice he’s made, they’re not weighing the policy choice itself. Instead, they’re generally assessing whether the president is trying to do the right thing, whether he’s fundamentally well-meaning. At the moment, they’re continuing to conclude that he is.
  • When the president’s criticised, 80% of Trump voters see it as an attack on ‘people like me’.
So are voters turned off when Trump fails to keep his promises, such as those about coal jobs? No. They give him points for taking their side against the elites. And they’re likely to blame other groups for stymieing him.
That’s good for Trump, since there’s no consistent thread running through his policy decisions. One month he says NATO’s relevant; the next he refuses to stand by Article 5, the collective defence agreement at the heart of the Treaty. He criticises Obama’s bombing in Libya, but later launches a cruise missile against Syrian government forces. Perhaps Trump’s biggest concern is simply to appear as if he’s getting things done.

[My notes aren’t a perfect distillation of the Special Report; they often concentrate on what I found interesting or novel. I also haven’t acknowledged any quotations, as most of the original material has been thoroughly interwoven.]

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